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Time to once again open my life up a little in order to share the plethora of wealth I'm about to absorb. I'm going to be back in Iraq through September, so hop on board and check back every couple of days, I'll do my best to update as much as possible. Questions? dtate38@cox.net And check out the site I'm working with: http://www.billroggio.com Support independent journalism!
Monday, November 15, 2004
Saturday Oct 30th, 2004 (cont)
When the order came down to move out, I'd just finished dinner and tea with the ANA and was relaxing with some local help that, according to the interpreter, earned me respect among the troops. I have found this to be the case wherever I went and interacted with the the Afghans.
As the men around me started to quickly pack, I stumbled my way up the dark, boulder strewn hill, which proved to be much more difficult than usual. With no light, I made my way to my fighting position and quickly packed all my gear and waited for the order.
Our mission was to provide covering fire for Bravo as they pulled back through the valley and village which was the center of the action earlier that day. Many of the guys were grumbling about the order, but followed without hesitation. 45 minutes into the wait, Bravo finally began to move.
We followed the 15+ vehicle convoy with night vision as they snaked past the base of the hill were on. We had to wait 10 minutes before we could move, which made everyone nervous about IEDs.
After 10 minutes, we were off in a long convoy of our own. All I could think about was IEDs. 45 minutes later, we were safe and sound back at our base camp which was within the walls of a National Directorate of Security compound. There we all unpacked and most hit the rack. I spent some time at the fire can with Charlie before pulling up my bedding on a dusty concrete floor inside the main building.
Sunday, October 31st 2004
We spent the morning packing up the camp to get ready for the 100 km move south to the FOB at Ghazni. Somehow, I lost my seat in the Humvee and ended up taking the trip in the back of a full 5-ton truck. It really wouldn't have been that bad except for the fact that my truck was pulling a trailer full of 50 gallon fuel drums. Obviously, this gave me some rather nauseating thoughts. Not only were we the perfect IED target, but we were pulling fuel as well. My only comfort was that my death would be quick in the event of an attack. The ride seemed to take forever, primarily because of the cold as the thought of attack went away rather quickly and we pulled into FOB Ghazni with no trouble at all.
Later that night came word that there was an attack and we were very concerned it came on the scout unit that was still out in Parwan. When an attack happens with casualties, they shut down the phones and internet so word can't get out prematurely. The guessing led to the guys getting upset because the only unit out was the scouts and the process of elimination was getting the guys riled up, particularly because many thought we pulled out too early.
So as a reporter should, I went looking for answers and quickly found them. Turns out it was the Iowa guard that was hit in a neighboring province which killed 1 and wounded two. I let my source know that the guys were very upset which prompted the leadership to quietly pass the word that the 3/116th was intact.
When the order came down to move out, I'd just finished dinner and tea with the ANA and was relaxing with some local help that, according to the interpreter, earned me respect among the troops. I have found this to be the case wherever I went and interacted with the the Afghans.
As the men around me started to quickly pack, I stumbled my way up the dark, boulder strewn hill, which proved to be much more difficult than usual. With no light, I made my way to my fighting position and quickly packed all my gear and waited for the order.
Our mission was to provide covering fire for Bravo as they pulled back through the valley and village which was the center of the action earlier that day. Many of the guys were grumbling about the order, but followed without hesitation. 45 minutes into the wait, Bravo finally began to move.
We followed the 15+ vehicle convoy with night vision as they snaked past the base of the hill were on. We had to wait 10 minutes before we could move, which made everyone nervous about IEDs.
After 10 minutes, we were off in a long convoy of our own. All I could think about was IEDs. 45 minutes later, we were safe and sound back at our base camp which was within the walls of a National Directorate of Security compound. There we all unpacked and most hit the rack. I spent some time at the fire can with Charlie before pulling up my bedding on a dusty concrete floor inside the main building.
Sunday, October 31st 2004
We spent the morning packing up the camp to get ready for the 100 km move south to the FOB at Ghazni. Somehow, I lost my seat in the Humvee and ended up taking the trip in the back of a full 5-ton truck. It really wouldn't have been that bad except for the fact that my truck was pulling a trailer full of 50 gallon fuel drums. Obviously, this gave me some rather nauseating thoughts. Not only were we the perfect IED target, but we were pulling fuel as well. My only comfort was that my death would be quick in the event of an attack. The ride seemed to take forever, primarily because of the cold as the thought of attack went away rather quickly and we pulled into FOB Ghazni with no trouble at all.
Later that night came word that there was an attack and we were very concerned it came on the scout unit that was still out in Parwan. When an attack happens with casualties, they shut down the phones and internet so word can't get out prematurely. The guessing led to the guys getting upset because the only unit out was the scouts and the process of elimination was getting the guys riled up, particularly because many thought we pulled out too early.
So as a reporter should, I went looking for answers and quickly found them. Turns out it was the Iowa guard that was hit in a neighboring province which killed 1 and wounded two. I let my source know that the guys were very upset which prompted the leadership to quietly pass the word that the 3/116th was intact.
